Agenda Setting

Note: for information on Certiorari, please see here.

Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court

The first important aspect to note are the institutional rules governing the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting decisions. Again, Congress has the ability to alter the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to determine which appeals it must hear versus those that it has the discretion to hear. But, of course, Congress does not specify how the Court should go about making its agenda-setting decisions.

The only guidelines the justices have in setting their agenda comes from the Court’s own self-established rules. Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court identifies the “character of reasons” that the Court should find compelling enough to grant review. These reasons include decisions issued by either state supreme courts or U.S. courts of appeals that conflict with either state courts of last resort, U.S. circuit courts, or the Supreme Court. They also include decisions in which either state supreme courts or federal circuit courts decide an issue that has never been settled by the Supreme Court, and lastly, when one of these courts departs “from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings”. The petitioner is required to discuss their case based on this list of circumstances.

Source: Elizabeth A. Lane and Ryan C. Black, OUP

Resources

See Also

Judicial politics, Supreme Court, Certiorari, Constitutional court, Public law

Further Reading

• Baird, V. A. (2004). The effect of politically salient decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda. Journal of Politics, 66(3), 755–772.
• Baird, V. A. (2007). Answering the call of the court: How justices and litigants set the supreme court agenda. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
• Black, R. C., & Boyd, C. L. (2012a). U.S. Supreme Court agenda setting and the role of litigant status. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 28(2), 286–312.
• Black, R. C., & Boyd, C. L. (January 2012b). The role of law clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process. American Politics Research, 40(1), 147–173.
• Black, R. C., & Boyd, C. L. (December 2013). Selecting the select few: The discuss list and the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process. Social Science Quarterly, 94(4), 1124–1144.
• Black, R. C., Boyd, C. L., & Bryan, A. C. (2014). Revisiting the influence of law clerks on the us supreme court’s agenda-setting process. Marquette Law Review, 98, 75.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2009a). Agenda setting in the Supreme Court: The collision of policy and jurisprudence. Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1062–1075.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2009b). Analyzing the reliability of Supreme Court justices’ agenda-setting records. Justice System Journal, 30(3), 254–264.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2011). Solicitor general influence and agenda setting on the U.S. Supreme Court. Political Research Quarterly, 64(4), 765–778.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2012a). The solicitor general and the United States Supreme Court: Executive branch influence and judicial decisions. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2012b). Looking back to move forward: quantifying policy predictions in political decision making. American Journal of Political Science, 56(4), 802–816.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2012c). Consider the source (and the message) Supreme Court Justices and strategic audits of lower court decisions. Political Research Quarterly, 65(2), 385–395.
• Black, R. C., & Owens, R. J. (2016). Courting the president: How circuit court judges alter their behavior for promotion to the Supreme Court. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 30–43.
• Black, R. C., Sorenson, M. W., & Johnson, T. R. (2013, December). Toward an actor-based measure of Supreme Court case salience information-seeking and engagement during oral arguments. Political Research Quarterly, 66(4), 804–818.
• Blake, W. D., Hacker, H. J., & Hopwood, S. R. (2015, December). Seasonal affective disorder: Clerk training and the success of Supreme Court certiorari petitions. Law & Society Review, 49(4), 973–997.
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• Brenner, S. (1979). The new certiorari game. Journal of Politics, 41(2), 649–655.
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• Epstein, L., & Knight, J. (1998). The choices judges make. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
• Epstein, L., & Knight, J. (2000). Toward a strategic revolution in judicial politics: a look back, a look ahead. Political Research Quarterly, 53(3), 625–661.
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• Epstein, L., Segal, J. A., & Victor, J. N. (2002). Dynamic agenda-setting on the United States Supreme Court: An empirical assessment. Harvard Journal on Legislation, 39, 395.
• Federal Judicial Center. (2015). Historical caseloads of the federal courts.
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• Harvey, A., & Friedman, B. (2009, April). Ducking trouble: Congressionally induced selection bias in the Supreme Court’s agenda. Journal of Politics, 71(2), 574–592.
• Klein, D. E., & Hume, R. J. (2003). Fear of reversal as an explanation of lower court compliance. Law & Society Review, 37(3), 579–581.
• Hurwitz, M. S. (July 2006). Institutional arrangements and the dynamics of agenda formation in the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals. Law & Policy, 28(3), 321–344.
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• Liptak, A. (2008, September 25). A second justice opts out of a longtime custom: The “cert. pool.” The New York Times.
• Mak, M., Sidman, A. H., & Sommer, U. (2013, March). Is certiorari contingent on litigant behavior? Petitioners’ role in strategic auditing. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 10(1), 54–75.
• Maltzman, F., Spriggs, J. F., & Wahlbeck, P. J. (2000). Crafting law on the supreme court: The collegial game. Cambridge University Press.
• Maltzman, F., & Wahlbeck, P. J. (1996a). Inside the U.S. Supreme Court: The reliability of the justices’ conference records. Journal of Politics, 58(2), 528–539.
• Maltzman, F., & Wahlbeck, P. J. (1996b). May it please the chief? Opinion assignments in the Rehnquist Court. American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 421–443.
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• Owens, R. J., & Simon, D. A. (March 2011). Explaining the Supreme Court’ shrinking docket. William and Mary Law Review, 53(4), 1219.
• Find this resource:
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• Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (1993). The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
• Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (2002). The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model revisited. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
• Sommer, U. (2011). How rational are justices on the supreme court of the United States? Doctrinal considerations during agenda setting. Rationality & Society, 23(4), 452–477.
• Songer, D. R. (1979). Concern for policy outputs as a cue for Supreme Court decisions on certiorari. Journal of Politics, 41(4), 1185–1194.
• Songer, D. R., Cameron, C. M., & Segal, J. A. (1995). An empirical test of the rational-actor theory of litigation. Journal of Politics, 57(4), 1119–1129.
• Spaeth, H. J. (2004). Relisting: An unexamined feature of Supreme Court decision making. Justice System Journal, 25(2), 143–158.
• Spriggs, J. F., Maltzman, F., & Wahlbeck, P. J. (1999). Bargaining on the US Supreme Court: Justices’ responses to majority opinion drafts. Journal of Politics, 61(2), 485–506.
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• Wahlbeck, P. J., Spriggs, J. F., & Maltzman, F. (1998). Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and accommodation on the United States Supreme Court. American Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 294–315.
• Ward, A., & Weiden, D. L. (2006). Sorcerers’ apprentices: 100 years of law clerks at the United States Supreme Court. New York: New York University Press.
• Zorn, C. J. W. (2002). U.S. Government litigation strategies in the Federal Appellate Courts. Political Research Quarterly, 55(1), 145–166.