Military State-Building

Military State-Building in United States

Implications of a Department of Defense State-Building Role for the U.S. Military in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of Implications of a Department of Defense State-Building Role for the U.S. Military in the above context, offering the key elements of the topic in relation to the extent of the U.S. Military Providing Needed State-Building Capabilities.Maintaining state-building capabilities within the U.S. military services is not without cost. Department of Defense has made a considerable front end investment in developing doctrine, training, and exercises for these capabilities [50]. Further developing and maintaining appropriate skill levels and special abilities (such as personnel with all needed language capabilities) comes at an additional cost. At a time when increasing budget constraints and a drawdown of active duty troops over the next several years seem likely, defense analysts may raise concerns about the possible trade-offs of maintaining such capabilities. If the price of retaining adequate capabilities requires keeping a substantially larger number of military personnel, this additional cost may be factored into a debate over weapons modernization vs. personnel budgets.

Because of these additional costs and the burden that performing such tasks can place on overstretched military forces, as well as the perception that civilians can often perform these tasks better, Department of Defense leaders have long pushed for the development of a civilian capacity for statebuilding activities. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates repeatedly urged Congress to fund these capabilities, as have the two recent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [51].

More Details about Implications of a Department of Defense State-Building Role for the U.S. Military

Given these costs, Congress may wish to consider whether Department of Defense should remain the default capability for planning and conducting state-building activities or whether to expand civilian capabilities sufficiently to permit Department of Defense to retain only those needed for situations too hostile for civilians to operate. Policymakers who judge that retaining state-building and other stability operations capacity in Department of Defense may be the best option for the United States into the foreseeable future may wish to improve Department of Defense’s ability to carry out such missions. One option might be to implement the DSB 2005 proposal to create a position for Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) that has never been instituted [52]. (Responsibility for stability operations remains under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, i.e., SO/LIC.) Another would be to ensure that all Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 mandates are fully implemented.

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

  1. 50 For instance, the Army created a Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, http://pksoi.army.mi/, the services and JCS invested considerable effort in developing multiple doctrine and other manuals for stability operations, and military training centers developed new training scenarios for stability operations.
  2. 51 In its 2004 report, Transitions, the Defense Science Board urged Congress to adopt the legislation proposed by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator, now Vice President Joe Biden establishing the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The following year, in a prepared statement for congressional testimony in February 2005, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers cited the creation of State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as an important step and stated that if it were “given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations.” Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted at that time on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.

    52 Institutionalizing Stability Operations, p. 24. This option is not included in the tables of proposals because it concerns Department of Defense organization.

Further Reading

  • Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
  • Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
  • Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
  • SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
  • Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
  • ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
  • Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
  • Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
  • PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
  • QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
  • CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
  • CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
  • QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
  • RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
  • CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
  • DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
  • Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy
    , Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
  • Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
  • SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
  • NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

    Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

  • PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
  • PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
  • Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

    U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

  • Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
  • Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

    Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

  • Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
  • QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
  • QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
  • RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
  • RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.

Posted

in

,

by