History of Interagency Requirements in United States

Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11 in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11 in the above context, offering the key elements of the topic.In the mid-2000s, several studies set forth proposals to reform “the interagency,” as the interdepartmental formal and informal cooperation system is known, largely in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies (in 2004 and 2005) advocated broad changes for “stability” operations—defined to include security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges [13]. The DSB studies focused on reforms to be undertaken by Department of Defense and the U.S. military to a far greater extent than any previous or subsequent study. Nevertheless, the 2005 study also stated that Department of Defense and the State Department needed to develop “an extraordinarily close working relationship,” and that both departments needed to augment stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Among the changes in Department of Defense the 2005 study advocated were elevating the profile of stability operations within Department of Defense through the creation of high level posts, and raising the status of stability operations to “core missions,” that is, on a par with combat operations.

Over the next few years, a second crop of studies on improving missions abroad focused on proposals to bring greater coherence to a variety of peacetime activities. Some of those studies advocated that action be taken to prevent conflict when it initially seemed a possibility (and not just as a reoccurrence in postconflict situations). They viewed preventive action as critical to U.S. efforts to contain the spread of terrorism and to combat the threats from growing transnational crime. Many saw the early proposals to improve the U.S. ability to deal with conflict and its aftermath as applicable to these “steady state” missions as well. One 2008 study drew “lessons learned” from nearly two decades of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations and stated that those lessons “can also have utility for a broader range of U.S. engagements abroad during both military and nonmilitary activities,” including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict activities [14].These studies, spanning a decade, differed in several respects, but largely agreed on the need for U.S. government reforms. For the most part, their recommendations rested on two fundamental premises: (1) the need to empower civilians to lead and conduct all missions except those in dangerously hostile situations, providing the necessary resources for them to do so, and (2) the need to replace ad hoc, “stove-piped” systems with improved mechanisms for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations and for implementing them. Their recommendations were often based on the judgment that the greatest threats to U.S. security would emerge in states that were either too weak to police their territory or lacked the political will or capacity to do so. State-building (a term some argued more appropriate than nation-building) activities to promote a more stable world by fostering the development of legitimate, open, and effective governments abroad, was at the center of the strategy developed to deal with these threats. This belief ran counter to many policymakers’ perceptions during the 1990s that the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries was an overly expensive, if not futile exercise.

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

1. 13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, December 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Transitions); and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, September 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Institutionalizing Stability Operations.). The Defense Science Board, established in 1956, is a prestigious standing committee of about forty members—civilians and retired military—selected for leadership in science and technology, and its application to military requirements. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb The Board reports directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).

   14 Robert H. Hunter, principal author, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, RAND and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. xix. Hereinafter referred to as Integrating Instruments of Power.

Further Reading

• Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
• Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
• Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
• SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
• Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
• ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
• Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
• Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
• PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
• QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
• CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
• CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
• QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
• RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahe
  l, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
• CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
• DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
• Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
• Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
• SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
• NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

  Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

• PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
• PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
• Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

  U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

• Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
• Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

  Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

• Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
• QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
• QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.