Void

Void in the United States

Void Definition

That which has no force or effect. “Void” is often loosely used in varied meanings, and applied indiiferently (according to the definition of Void based on the Cyclopedic Law Dictionary ) to a thing which has no force or effect, and is an absolute nullity, or to that which by reason of some inherent vice or defect, may be adjudged void by a court when the question is presented to it; often used in the sense of “voidable”. Read more about the meaning of Void in the legal Dictionaries.

Void Judgements, Decisions or Orders by Judges

In U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61(1878), the U.S. Supreme Court stated at 98 U.S. at 66:

“Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sect. 499: ‘Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract.”

“Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that ‘tends to encompass almost any set of circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing’ ” Estate of Sanders v. Sutton, 40 Cal. 3d 607, 614 (1985).

Case law has long held that “…any act of a disqualified judge is absolutely void whenever brought into question. A judgment rendered by such a judge is open to attack at any time.” In re Henry C., 161 Cal.App.3d 646, 652 (1985) citing T.P.B. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 886 (1977). In Rossco Holdings Inc. v. Bank of America, 149 Cal.App.4th 1353 (2007), 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, the court stated at page 148:

“Orders made by a disqualified judge are void. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy (1932), 214 Cal. 562, 6 P.2d 944; Christie v. City of El Centro (2006), 135 Cal.App.4th 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.) There is a dispute in recent appellate authority as to whether such orders should be considered void or only voidable at the option of a party; the Supreme Court’s latest opinion on the matter held them to be void. (Christie v. City of El Centro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 769-780, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.)….”[Disqualification occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when the disqualification is established.” (Christie v. City of El Centro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 776, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.) “[I]t is the fact of disqualification that controls, not subsequent
judicial action on that disqualification.” (Id. at p. 777, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 718.)

In Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that no court could validate a void judgment at 254 U.S. at 353-354:

“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them.
If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and
orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” (Citations omitted)

Vallely, supra, was cited in American Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir., 2007) in which the court stated at page 539:

“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [go] beyond the power delegated to
them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. Vallely v. N. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353- 354; 41 S.Ct. 116; 65 L.Ed 297 (1920)’

The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment. …. ”

The U.S. Supreme Court decision of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) required the circuit court to decide the issue of fraud when it was defrauded stating at 322 U.S. at 248-251:

“Equitable relief against fraudulent judgments is not of statutory creation. It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a
hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the general rule that judgments should not be disturbed after the term of their entry has expired. Created to avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to meet new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations. …..

When this Court, a century ago, approved this practice and held that federal appellate courts have the power to pass upon, and hence to grant or deny, petitions for bills of review even though the petitions be presented long after the term of the challenged judgment has expired, maybe it settled the procedural question here involved:

Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 547, 14 L.Ed. 1052. 4 ……We hold, therefore, that the Circuit Court on the record here presented5 had both the duty and the power to vacate its own judgment and to give the District Court appropriate directions.”

In California, there is no time limit or reasonable diligence requirement for an attack on a void judgment; the attack may be made at any time. (Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857
(2002); Plotitsa v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.App.3d 755 (1983).)

The 9th Circuit case of United States v. Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, (9th Cir. 2011) defined fraud upon the court to encompass the actions of judicial officers that “harmed the integrity of the judicial process” or “defile the court.” The 9th Circuit stated at page 443 in relevant part:

“In determining whether fraud constitutes fraud on the court, the relevant inquiry is not whether fraudulent conduct “prejudiced the opposing party,” but whether it ” harm[ed]’
the integrity of the judicial process.” Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F2d.421, 424 (9th Cir. 1989). Fraud on the court involves “far more than an injury to a single litigant.” Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246.

[T]he inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for fraud upon the court under Rule 60(b) focuses not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process . . . In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1991). (…)

“Fraud on the court” should, we believe, embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication. In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1991). (quoting 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice f 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978)).”

Some courts and commentators have suggested that perjury should not usually constitute fraud on the court unless “an attorney or other officer of the court was a party to it.” 11 Wright & Miller § 2870.

Void in Foreign Legal Encyclopedias

For starting research in the law of a foreign country:

Link Description
Void Void in the World Legal Encyclopedia.
Void Void in the European Legal Encyclopedia.
Void Void in the Asian Legal Encyclopedia.
Void Void in the UK Legal Encyclopedia.
Void Void in the Australian Legal Encyclopedia.

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