Theodore Roosevelt’s Broad Powers in the United States

Theodore Roosevelt swept into the White House (which he so named) under rather unfortunate circumstances; he had been vice-president under William McKinley, who was assassinated in September, 1901. Theodore Roosevelt (“TR”) made exceedingly fortunate use of his time. The youngest President ever inaugurated, Roosevelt was also among the most energetic chief executives ever. “The first [President] since Andrew Jackson to remind people that our government was a flexible instrument” (Andrews ix), Theodore Roosevelt boldly and decisively acted where others had waited for Congress to debate each move. Because of his shining personality and his tremendous ego, politicians often disliked Roosevelt. However, the public adored him. Theodore Roosevelt was elected in his own right in 1904, with the (then) greatest popular majority ever. Roosevelt’s presidency included no war to push him into the limelight, yet Theodore Roosevelt made his imprint on history many times over. Roosevelt was the first “trust-busting” President; he established many national parks; he strengthened the position of labor forces in strike negotiations; and he began the construction of the Panama Canal. Often in his seven years in office, Roosevelt interpreted his executive duties broadly, to say the least. Many conservatives worried about Roosevelt overextending his powers, and, on at least a few occasions, he was guilty thereof. Yet TR did not wish to abuse his office, though he might have. The decisive and benevolent–if possibly unconstitutional–actions that Theodore Roosevelt took benefitted America by making it a more equal and progressive place.

TR had several negative examples for commanding the country. In 1798, in the wake of the French Revolution and to stave off Republican criticism, John Adams’s Federalist administration passed some of the most restrictive acts in the United States’ history: the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Naturalization Act mandated that immigrants live in America 14 years before becoming citizens (Brown 122). The Act Concerning Aliens (also known as the Alien Friends Act) allowed the President to “deport any alien he considered dangerous to the public peace” (Brown 122). It was only to be in effect until 1800, the next presidential election year. Under the Act Respecting Alien Enemies, the President could order the deportation of “citizens of any country with which the United States was at war” (Brown 122). These fed on early nationalistic sentiments and fear of “Jacobins” from the bloody French Revolution at a time when war with France looked probable. The Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes, which went down in history as the Sedition Act, was the most criticized of the bunch. It provided prison sentences for speaking out against the President or the administration (Brown 122). It was also set to expire when the next President took office. This was decried as an obviously unconstitutional infringement on civil rights and as an illegal expansion of central government. The Acts stood, however. They put many people in jail and fixed a definite black mark on John Adams’s record in the service of his country.

Andrew Jackson was a popular president, but had dangerous ideas. Jackson wanted to remove the Native Americans (particularly such tribes as the Cherokee, the Chickasaw, and the Seminoles) from the Southern states to free up the land for white settlers. The Indians could go live in the then-unwanted land where Oklahoma now is: the ‘Great American Desert.’ In 1830, Congress passed a Removal Act to allow the Indians to be forced out (Wallace 66). The states in questions began passing “destructive legislation” (Wallace 75) to harrass the Native Americans off their land. Tribal governments were made illegal. “Indians were denied the right to vote, to bring suit, even to testify in court (as heathens all–despite the evidence of conversion for many–they could not swear a Christian oath)” (Wallace 75). Nevertheless, the Cherokee Nation managed to bring its case to the Supreme Court, which found in the Indians’ favor. Andrew Jackson ignored the decision, overturning the all-important constitutional system of checks and balances. Over the next decade, under Jackson and Martin Van Buren, the Indians were removed tribe by tribe, often forced by troops to walk to Oklahoma. Thousands died on what became known as the Trail of Tears. The broad license Theodore Roosevelt took with his executive powers had no such destructive effects. Unlike John Adams, Roosevelt never used the government as a shield from public opinion. Unlike Andrew Jackson, he respected the people of the United States. Though Roosevelt often vehemently criticized the legislative branch, he did not blatantly ignore the system of checks and balances so vital to the government of the USA.

To Theodore Roosevelt, the executive officer by definition had to run the show. He deplored the “Buchanan-Taft” vision of the presidency, referring to two presidents who moved more cautiously. James Buchanan, TR wrote in his Autobiography in 1913, “took the . . . narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people, and can do nothing . . . unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action” (198).

This contrasted heavily with Roosevelt’s own perspective of his duties:

“My view was that every executive officer . . . was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. . . . My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws” (Roosevelt 197).

In comparison with himself, Theodore Roosevelt regarded Congress as “indecisive and irresolute as an institution” (Gould 11). Roosevelt was the first Progressive president, bent on improving the United States with all his might. He refused to let his vigorous courses of action be delayed by Congress’ debate.

One of the progressive uses Roosevelt made of his office throughout his administration was “trust-busting.” In the decade before he rose to power, business had been left alone, despite the Sherman anti-trust law. This 1890 law was supposed to prevent corporations from consolidating to form monopolies on their industries, but it had been wildly ineffective. In one of the few cases when it was applied against the Sugar Trust, the Supreme Court had ruled that the government had no right to regulate the production of “commodities within a State” because it was not ‘interstate commerce,’ though the trust affected the whole nation’s sale of sugar (Roosevelt 226). The 1890s Supreme Court was loathe to regulate industry in any way. It even ruled that a minimum wage or maximum hours law would violate workers’ rights to sell their labor on their own terms (Blum 32). Roosevelt was to change that.

Theodore Roosevelt’s Attorney General began proceedings against the Northern Securities Company soon after Roosevelt’s inauguration. Northern Securities, an alliance between several northwestern railroads designed to stop panicked competition, had suffered from heavy criticism since its inception. Shippers had feared it as a trust. It was a vulnerable and therefore alluring first target for Theodore Roosevelt (Blum 34). He succeeded in disbanding Northern Securities.

Theodore Roosevelt’s administration began forty-four antitrust proceedings, including against the American Tobacco Company and against John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company (Blum 36). The many cases established guidelines for later prosecutions that had not existed during the Northern Securities case (Blum 36). Roosevelt defined antitrust proceedings. However, he disliked the label “trust-buster.” Theodore Roosevelt had no objection to consolidation for preventing “ruinous” competition (Blum 37). Roosevelt, concerned with equal treatment for all, only was opposed to monopolies designed to stifle all competition. This was the first time government effectively regulated business.

A celebrated story of Roosevelt decisiveness comes from the 1902 Anthracite Coal strike. 50,000 United Mine Workers of northern Pennsylvania walked out in May, demanding a 10-20% raise, recognition of their union, an eight-hour workday, and fringe benefits. Until October, the UMW danced around the owners of the six big mines in the region. The union continually professed its willingness to negotiate, but the owners refused. Waiting “for the union to crack” (Mowry 134), two of the owners claimed that God had granted them their extensive property rights (Mowry 135). Finally, with coal increasingly scarce, as even schools and hospitals grew cold and riots threatened in several cities, Roosevelt called the UMW and the coal operators to the White House for a meeting.

Mitchell, the union leader, offered to meet with the operators at any time or accept binding arbitration by a commission TR appointed (Mowry 136). Various operators, in contrast, railed that the President asked them “to deal with outlaws”; accused the union of over 20 murders; and suggested the strike be broken by the Army, violently if necessary (Mowry 136-137). ‘Insulting’ the President and Attorney General, never acknowledging the union’s representatives, they finally left in a huff (Mowry 137). Unimpressed, Theodore Roosevelt put it to advisers that he was considering taking the federal troops the operators asked for, but to confiscate the mines from them. The troops would produce coal for the country.

This scared the operators back to the negotiating table. Never before had a President threatened “to seize and operate a major industry” (Mowry 140). Such a power was not even implied in the Constitution, and Roosevelt could probably not have carried out his threat. However, the threat did resolve the Anthracite Coal issue. On October 13, a temporary settlement was finalized. The workers went back to work, and TR appointed an arbitral board to iron out the conflicts of interest. Eventually, the union workers received a 10 percent raise, and working hours were lowered; but the union remained unrecognized, and the board granted the operators the right to raise coal prices 10 percent.

In the Anthracite Coal issue, Roosevelt set a host of ‘firsts’ that were important in future crises. For the first time, labor and capital had come to the White House on equal terms. Government used its influence to negotiate a settlement for the first time. Never before had a President appointed an arbitral board to settle such labor questions. It was also the first time for such threats against the operators (Mowry 139). Though Theodore Roosevelt stepped beyond his legal bounds to wrangle out a settlement, it resulted in powerful precedents and fair treatment of the much-abused labor forces. In this issue Roosevelt coined the catchy phrase “square deal” referring to his treatment of the participants in the debate. In every crisis he took on, Roosevelt tried with his vigor, and according to his sensibilities, to achieve fairness for all parties involved.

Theodore Roosevelt, it may be noted, was not a wild-eyed unionist who never listened to the business side of things. He opposed labor boycotts, force during strikes (by strikers or anyone else), and unions meddling in politics (Mowry 141). On another occasion, Roosevelt sent federal troops to Morenci, Arizona, to break up a mine strike, though he did withdraw when he realized they were only good for intimidating the strikers (Mowry 140). TR “refused to condemn publicly the use of illegal force by the mining corporations in Colorado [during another crisis], although he criticized them privately. . .” (Mowry 141). Roosevelt was quite sympathetic to the corporations; his support of labor stemmed mostly from a balanced view of the issues. He wrote: “I would guarantee by every means in my power the right of laboring men to join a union, and their right to work as union men without illegal interference from either capitalists or nonunion men” (qtd. in Mowry 141). Roosevelt believed in unions in principle; he did not want either labor forces or capitalists to go too far in asserting their ‘rights.’ “Big labor, like big capital, [Theodore Roosevelt] remarked, was one of the laws of the social and economic development of the age. Unions, he believed, contributed to the general welfare” (Mowry 141).

Roosevelt occasionally did stretch his powers too far. Though supported at the time, his actions regarding the Panama Canal were not good for the nations involved; and the precedents they set were dangerous. Thankfully, they have not been repeated.

Theodore Roosevelt had a dream for America to which an isthmian canal was vital. “He had a vision of his country as the commanding power on two oceans, and these joined by a canal built, owned, operated, policed, and fortified by his country. The canal was to be the first step to American supremacy at sea” (McCullough 250). TR had little patience when Colombia, whose state of Panama had been chosen as the site of the canal, hesitated.

The United States wanted to buy the works at the site that the French Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de Panama had already begun and become disillusioned with. Colombia demanded a piece of the pie–it was Colombia’s land, after all–and would not be satisfied with the treaty that everyone in Washington was convinced was fair. The American minister to Colombia, Arthur Beaupré, wrote that the Colombians did not believe they would remain sovereign over Panama under the American treaty. He wrote that they were afraid “the [supposedly 100- year] lease is perpetual . . . the whole document is favorable to the United States and detrimental to Colombia” (qtd. in McCullough 333). The United States grew increasingly impatient. In June, 1903, the New York World carried an unsigned article stating that “information has also reached this city that the State of Panama . . . stands ready to secede from Colombia and enter into a canal treaty with the United States” (McCullough 334). It suggested that American plans to support such a revolt were already being made. While this may simply have been yellow journalism, there is no question that the United States was waiting eagerly for any resolution to the conflict.

Panama did revolt on November 3, 1903, with the only casualties being one man and a donkey (McCullough 371). This was not a minute too soon for the United States, who seems to have had foreknowledge of the coup. At 12:51 p.m., November 6, only seventy minutes after official word reached the U.S. of the “Isthmian movement’s” success, the United States formally recognized the Republic of Panama. Roosevelt immediately negotiated a favorable treaty with the new nation and construction started with all speed. Roosevelt felt extremely justified in his handling of the situation. Any more formal actions, such as asking permission of Congress, would have delayed the canal unpardonably.

Theodore Roosevelt explained his actions in a speech to people at the University of California at Berkely, in 1911:
“But the Panama Canal would not have been started if I had not taken hold of it, because if I had followed the traditional or conservative method I should have submitted an admirable state paper occupying a couple of hundred pages detailing all of the facts to Congress and asking Congress’ consideration of it.

In that case there would have been a number of excellent speeches made on the subject in Congress; the debate would be proceeding at this moment with great spirit and the beginning of work on the canal would be fifty years in the future. [Laughter and applause.]

Fortunately the crisis came at a period when I could act unhampered. Accordingly I took the Isthmus, started the Canal and then left Congress not to debate the canal, but to debate me.” [Laughter and applause] (qtd. in McCullough 383-384).

Theodore Roosevelt felt that the situation had demanded prompt action to the extent that it justified usurping executive powers. Though there is no doubt that Roosevelt greatly speeded the opening of the Panama Canal, it came at a fairly high price. As Thomas Jefferson did with the Louisiana Purchase, Theodore Roosevelt went around the House of Representatives, the Senate and the Constitution to gain land. This canal greatly harmed the United States’ foreign relations in Latin America and tore apart Colombia. The USA recognized later with what impunity it had acted, and in 1921 paid Colombia $25,000,000 to apologize for Panama’s loss (McCullough 617). Roosevelt did not live to see that apology, but he was furious when it was first proposed during Woodrow Wilson’s administration. “One of the rather contemptible features of a number of our worthy compatriots,” Roosevelt wrote, “is that they are eager to take advantage of the deeds of the man of action when action is necessary and then eager to discredit him when the action is once over” (qtd. in McCullough 617). Theodore Roosevelt always believed he did the best he could under the circumstances. Most times he did act correctly, but in this case he pushed his and the United States’ powers beyond the limits of decency.

Politicians could not trust Theodore Roosevelt. They found him too impulsive and too individualist. Even at his inauguration, Roosevelt’s own Republican party was worried about what it could expect of him. “Throughout his rise in the party, Roosevelt had shown a streak of independence and a skepticism about party dogma” (Gould 12). This did not make for good loyalties. It has been said that Senator Mark Hanna, on hearing of McKinley’s death, exploded, “Now look! That damned cowboy is President of the United States” (qtd. in McCullough 247).

Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship with Congress in general was strained. Roosevelt consistently insulted the time-consuming debate with which it operated and called members “scoundrels and crooks” and “fools” (Gould 11). “Roosevelt and Congress were destined for divisiveness” (Gould 10). The Senators and Representatives resented the steady rise in presidential power that had been occurring since 1877, and resented even more Theodore Roosevelt’s usual tone of command. Though he never addressed the whole Congress, Roosevelt sent to Congress more than 400 presidential messages.

The legislative branch could also feel disenfranchised because of the public criticism that failure to act during Roosevelt’s administration always brought. However much politicians worried about his individualism, the public always loved Theodore Roosevelt. “As a political leader, Theodore Roosevelt combined innovative and traditional characteristics that he fused into a singularly attractive public personality” (Gould 9). Roosevelt was interesting: author, historian, ornithologist, athlete, family man. He knew how to publicize himself, as well. Rosevelt was known to act as his own press secretary, using leaks, background interviews, exclusive stories, and more (Gould 9). The press adored Theodore Roosevelt as well. After his election in 1904, Roosevelt felt overjoyed no longer to be a ‘political accident.’ Far from that, he had been put back in office by the greatest popular majority up until that time in the nation’s history.

Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency was one of the most dynamic periods of the United States. Roosevelt had no troubles using his office to the fullest allowable power and beyond, but he never used it in self-interest. Roosevelt extended presidential powers because he believed that he best served his country with quick, vigorous decisions. He wrote in his Autobiography: “I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition” (198).

This is a good distillation of Theodore Roosevelt’s motives. Theodore Roosevelt was a man of action. Though he acted rashly sometimes, Roosevelt loved his country and his presidency improved the nation.

(Source: Erin Ruth Leonard)

Works Cited

Andrews, Wayne. Introduction. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. By Theodore Roosevelt. Ed. Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. ix-xi.
Blum, John Morton. The Progressive Presidents: Roosevelt, Wilson, Roosevelt, Johnson. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982.

Brown, Ralph Adams. The Presidency of John Adams. American Presidency Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975.

Gould, Lewis L. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. American Presidency Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

McCullough, David. The Path Between the Seas: the Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870 1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977.

Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt. Evanston: Harper & Row, 1958.

Roosevelt, Theodore. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. Centennial edition. Ed. Wayne Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. *Primary source.

Wallace, Anthony F.C. The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians. New York: Hill and Wang–Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993.

Futher Readig

Andrews, Wayne. Introduction. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. By Theodore Roosevelt. Ed. Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. ix-xi.
Blum, John Morton. The Progressive Presidents: Roosevelt, Wilson, Roosevelt, Johnson. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982.

Brinkley, Alan. “Why Clinton Is No TR.” Newsweek 27 Jan. 1997: 46.

Brown, Ralph Adams. The Presidency of John Adams. American Presidency Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975.

Gould, Lewis L. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. American Presidency Series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

McCullough, David. The Path Between the Seas: the Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870 1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977.

Mitchell, Alison. “Speaking Softly in the Bully Pulpit.” New York Times 19 Jan. 1997, Ohio ed., sec. 4: 1+.

Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt. Evanston: Harper & Row, 1958.

Roosevelt, Theodore. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. Centennial edition. Ed. Wayne Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. *Primary source.

——. American Ideals and Other Essays. New York: The Knickerbocker Press–G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898. *Primary source.

Wallace, Anthony F.C. The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians. New York: Hill and Wang–Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993.

Zinn, Howard. The Twentieth Century. New York: Perennial Library–Harper & Row, 1984.