State-building Missions in United States

Utility of State-building Missions in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of Utility of State-building Missions in the above context, offering the key elements of the topic and in relation to Interagency Reform for Missions Abroad.To those policymakers and analysts who would discount the need to deal with numerous or high visibility situations requiring extensive state-building in the foreseeable future, the need for interagency reform, especially those aspects of it dealing with increasing civilian capacity and integrative personnel measures, may seem less than pressing. Similarly, this need would be discounted by those who are skeptical that the United States can effect significant changes in other states—weak, failing, or simply seriously flawed—through military or political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions.

The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success. There is considerable skepticism that state-building efforts often result in success. In the words of one scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them anew…. The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere [41].”

More Details about Utility of State-building Missions

On the other hand, some analysts judge that some international post-conflict state-building efforts have had considerable success. Mozambique and El Salvador are often pointed to as cases where state-building during and after civil strife promoted durable peace in the early 1990s. While two countries where the United States intervened militarily in the 1990s—Haiti and Somalia—are still highly problematic, the Balkans, once aflame with war, is stable despite the persistence of ethnic tensions. A 2003 RAND study that looked at eight U.N. peacekeeping missions (plus Iraq, where the U.N. played a role) judged that “seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic … substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy [42].” The long period of time that it takes conditions in post-conflict countries to stabilize—for instance in Bosnia- Hercegovina (after the Dayton peace accord of December 1995) and in Kosovo as a separate entity from Serbia (after the NATO military intervention of 1999) is not surprising to some analysts in light of assessments that state-building efforts take many years to produce results [43].

U.S. and international efforts to improve the possibilities of success for mitigating conflict and improving state-building operations are demonstrating what some regard as increasing promise. Continuing research and evaluation by the U.S. and other governments, as well as academia and think tanks, are advancing a broader understanding of the sources and drivers of conflict. There is a growing body of academic and government literature on the effectiveness of mechanisms used to defuse and settle conflicts, as well as sets of state-building best practices to prevent or ameliorate conflict [44] Some analysts judge that future U.S. state-building efforts—when conducted on the basis of this knowledge and carried out by trained and experienced personnel operating under a well-designed interagency framework—may be more successful than in the past.

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

1. 41 Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,” as reproduced in U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Final Report. 2008, pp. 80-81. For a short discussion of the elements contributing to the successful occupations in Japan and Germany, often not present elsewhere, see CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany, by Nina M. Serafino.
2. 42 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and Keith Crane, et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxxvi. The cases examined were the Belgium Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq.

   43 In an analysis of seven U.S. military interventions with nation-building objectives, RAND authors argue that a minimum of five years is necessary to produce even initial results. “The record suggest that, while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.” James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, and Keith Crane, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxiv.

   44 Under the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. government has advanced its instruments for assessing and organizing interagency responses to conflict, in particular the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), developed by United States Agency for International Development and State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization , and the Interagency Management System (IMS), developed by State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. These tools have not, however, been used consistently or systematically, according to practitioners. Reflecting on the ability of the U.S. government and the international community to deal with conflict, State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization acting director Robert Loftis stated that “Ideally, U.S. engagements will improve across time, tempered by testing assumptions, building knowledge, refuting simplistic models of what causes violence and replacing them with strategies built on real experience…. We cannot solve these problems alone or for the countries we aim to help. But we can improve our ability to work at the margins.” Transcript provided to CRS of remarks for delivery at George Mason University, August 10, 2011, p. 7.

Further Reading

• Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
• Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
• Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
• SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
• Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
• ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
• Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
• Buchanan/Davis/Wight
  2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
• PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
• QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
• CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
• CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
• QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
• RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
• CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
• DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
• Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
• Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
• SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
• NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

  Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

• PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
• PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
• Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

  U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

• Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
• Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

  Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

• Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
• QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
• QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.