Pocket Veto in the United States

Definition of Pocket Veto

A “pocket veto” is the designation applied to a bill or joint resolution that failed to become law at the expiration of ten days because the President withheld his signature and the Congress had adjourned during that period in a manner to prevent its return.

United States Constitution

According to the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, about its article titled “Pocket Veto”, “if Congress adjourns within ten days after passing a bill, the President can prevent the bill’s enactment by merely withholding his signature (Article I, section 7, clause 3, of the Constitution) . By means of this extension of the veto power, the President can kill legislation” (read more about Constitutional law entries here).

Pocket Veto Interpretation

The exercise of the President’s pocket veto authority during intra-session adjournments and recess periods has long been a controversial issue between the legislative and executive
branches of government. In the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929), the Supreme Court held that the President might utilize the pocket veto power during either intra-session adjournments of the House and Senate during the same Congress or adjournments between sessions. However, in Wright v. US., 302 U.S. 583 (1938), the Court modified this ruling in deciding that a recess within the same Congress by one House, with the other House remaining in session, would not “prevent” the President from returning a vetued bill if prior arrangements for the receipt of the measure had been made with the House that went out of session. In Kennedy v. Sampson, 364 FSupp. 1075 (D.D.C. 1973), the US. District Court interpreted the pocket veto clause of the Constitution as having two purposes: to provide the President with adequate time to review a bill presented to him and, second, to give Congress sufficient opportunity to review the Chief Executive’s objections and to override them if so desired. The court further held that intra-session adjournments within the same Congress do not prevent the return of a disap- proved bill to Congress, providing, as in the Wright decision, that appropriate provision has been made for receipt of the vetoed legislation. The Court of Appeals in 1974 unanimously affirmed that decision (511 F.2d 430 (1974)). In 1987 the case of Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), the Supreme Court declared the issue moot because the legislation in question had no effect after September 30, 1984. A 1981 pocket veto is still pending before United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. (1)

The court actions involving the interetation of pocket veto power, following the Document “Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988”, compiled by the Senate Library, Government Printing Office (1992), are the following:

S. 3185

Authorizing certain Indian tribes and bands, or any of them, residing in the State of Washington, to present their claims to the Court of Claims. Pocket veto occurred after the 1st session of the 69th Congress had adjourned sine die on July 3, 1926. The bill was presented to the President on June 22, 1926. (June 23, 1926, S. Jour., p. 527; see also H.R. Doc. No.
493, 70th Cong., 2d sess., p. 42).
Note-This veto was the subject of the “Pocket Veto Case” (Okanogan Indians v. United States (1929). The Supreme Court held that a bill must be returned to a sitting chamber of Congress. The pocket veto could, therefore, be used at any time when the chamber of origin was not in session on the tenth day following receipt of the legislation by the President.

S. 713

Granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear the case of David A. Wright.
Vetoed &Way 5, 1936. The veto message was laid before the Senate, referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and printed as S. Doc. No. 202. (80 Cong. Rec.
6767, 6768).

This Veto was unchallanged.
Note-This veto was the subject of Wright v. U.S. (302 US. 583 (1938)). The Supreme Court ruled that an official of the chamber in recess could receive the veto message and deliver that message to the chamber upon its return. This decision was a broader interpretation of Congressional power than the earlier “Pocket Veto Case’’.

S. 3418

To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the making of grants to medical schools and hospitals to assist them in establishing special departments and programs in the field of family practice.
The bill was presented to the President on December 14, 1970 (116 Cong. Rec. 41289). The pocket veto was attempted in the 2d session of the 91st Congress during a recess from December 22, 1970 to December 28, 1970.
Note-This veto was the subject of Kennedy v. Sampson (511 F.2d 430 (D.C.Cir. 19’74)). The Court of Appeals concluded that the President is not prevented from returning a bill if Congress has made appropriate arrangements for the receipt of presidential messages during the adjournment. An appeal was not taken to the Supreme Court. The bill S. 3418 became Public Law 91-696 (84 Stat. 2080-1; printed at 89 Stat. Prec. 2-1). This decision expanded Wright v. United States (Item No. 1275) by suggesting that a pocket veto

Although listed here among pocket vetoes, the bill is a regular veto and as an override because of the unique circumstances of its history.

H.R. 10511

To amend the Urban Mass Transpor~tion Act of 1964 to permit financial assistance to be furnished under that Act for the acquisition of certain equipment which may be used for charter service in a manner which does not foreclose private operators from furnishing such service.
A pocket veto was attempted after the 1st session of the 93d Congress had adjourned sine die on December 22, 1973. The bill was presented to the President on December 22, 1973. (119 Cong. Rec. 43327). A Presidential message dated January 3, 1974 was received
by the 2d session of the 93d Congress. (119 Cong. Rec. 43328).
Note-This veto was the subject of Kennedy v. Jones (412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976)). The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the pocket veto was unconstitutional because Congress had appointed officials to receive Presidential messages during the
intersession adjournment. Accordingly, H.R. 10511 was promulgated as Public Law 93-650 (89 Stat. Z-lk its provisions are essentially identical to (a) and (c) of Section 813 of Public Law 93-383 (88 Stat. 737). Despite the attempted pocket veto, the bill is listed here as a regular veto and is counted as such, and as an override, in Table 1, p. ix supra, because of the
unique circumstances of its history.

H.R. 14225

To amend and extend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for one additional year.
Vetoed October 29, 1974. The veto message was laid before the House and printed as H. Doc. 93-381. (120 Cong. Rec. 36246).
The House overrode the veto on November 20, 1974 by a vote of 398 yeas to 7 nays. (120 Cong. Rec. 36614).
The Senate overrode the veto on November 21, 1974 by a vote of 90 yeas to 1 nay. (120 Cong. Rec. 36842, 36849,36882).
Veto overridden.
Note-A Public Law number was not assigned to this bill due to the signing into law of an identical bill, H.R. 17503, which became Public Law 93-516; 88 Stat. 1617.
Note-President Ford vetoed five bills during the October 17 to November 18, 1974 adjournment period. These bills were H.R. 6624, H.R. 7768, H.R. 11541, H.R. 13342, and H.R. 14225. The bills were returned to the Clerk of the House with a message claiming that they had been pocket vetoed. Despite the pocket veto claim, Congress considered them to be regular vetoes and they are listed here and in accompanying tables as such.
The veto of H.R. 14225 (Item No. 2307) was overridden by both chambers, but the Administration failed to promulgate it as law. Senator Edward Kennedy amended a pending pocket veto claim to include H.R. 14225. The court held in Kennedy v. Jones (412 F.Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976)) that pocket vetoes could not be used except after adjournment sine die unless Congress failed to appoint individuals to receive messages. This decision reaffirmed Kenne-
dy v. Sampson. The provisions of H.R. 14225 were identical to H.R. 17503 which became
Public Law 93-516 (88 Stat. 1617). Therefore, H.R. 14225 was not assigned a public law number.

H.R. 4353

To amend the Federal Bankruptcies Act of 1978. Pocket veto occurred after the 1st session of the 97th Congress adjourned sine die on December 16, 1981. The bill was presented to the President on December 18, 1981. (127 Cong. Rec. 31893) A Presidential message was received by Congress on January 6, 1982. (127 Cong. Rec. 31894).
Note-This veto was the subject of a court case brought by a private corporation which raised the constitutionality of a pocket veto between sessions of the 97th Congress. The case did not result in any reported decision (Fidelity Mortgage Investors, No. 15-B-154 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y.) and Lifetime Communities Inc. v. Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, No. 81-
Civ.-0544 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y.)).

H.R. 4042

To continue in effect the current certification requirements with respect to El Salvador. Pocket veto occurred after the 1st session of the 98th Congress adjourned sine die on November 18, 1983. The bill was presented to the President on November 18, 1983. (129 Cong. Rec. 34225).
Note-This veto was the subject of Barnes v. Carmen (582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984:). The district court upheld the President’s veto citing the Supreme Court’s Pocket Veto Case . This ruling was overturned upon appeal in Barnes v. KIine (759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Since Congress had appointed officials to receive messages, the court concluded that the use of the pocket veto was ~nc~nstitutional.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the issue was moot since the provisions of WR. 4042 had noeffect after Sept. 30, 1984 (Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1978)). The bill was neither signed, nor returned, nor promulgated into law.

Some Constitutional Law Popular Entries

Notes

“Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988”, compiled by the Senate Library, Government Printing Office (1992)

Pocket Veto in the Legislative Process

A procedure by which the president can effectively veto legislation passed by Congress without officially vetoing it. If Congress adjourns from its session within ten days of submitting a bill to the president for his signature, and the president then does nothing—neither signing nor vetoing the bill—then the measure dies and the president is said to have executed a pocket veto, metaphorically killing the bill by sticking it in his pocket and forgetting about it.

More about Pocket Veto in the Legislative Process

If the president takes no action on a bill received from Congress during the last ten days of the Congressional session, the bill does not become law; it is “pocket vetoed.”

Pocket Veto (in Politics)

Related to political science, the following is a definition of Pocket Veto in the U.S. practice of politics: A legislative tactic that allows the President to indirectly veto a bill.

The U.S. Constitution requires the President to sign a bill within the 10 days if Congress is in session. If Congress is in session and the president fails to sign the bill, it becomes law without his signature. However, if Congress adjourns before the ten days are up and the President does not sign the bill, it will not become law. Ignoring it, or putting it in your pocket, has been called a pocket veto.

Concept of Pocket Veto in Political Science

The following is a very basic definition of Pocket Veto in relation to the election system and the U.S Congress: When a bill is dropped because the President does not act on it

Pocket Veto

Pocket Veto in the United States

Definition of Pocket Veto

United States Constitution

Pocket Veto Interpretation

S. 3185

S. 713

S. 3418

H.R. 10511

H.R. 14225

H.R. 4353

H.R. 4042

Some Constitutional Law Popular Entries

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Notes

Pocket Veto in the Legislative Process

More about Pocket Veto in the Legislative Process

Pocket Veto (in Politics)

Concept of Pocket Veto in Political Science

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