Obama Interagency Reform in United States

The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform in the above context, reporting on the key problems and reform proposals, offering the essential facts of the topic.The United States’ system for decision-making and implementing foreign affairs missions and activities is considered dysfunctional by many analysts. One recent study characterizes the exercise of foreign relations as “a mob scene” of individual and independent agencies [25]. The problems are perceived across many national security areas, including counterterrorism, failed states/post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, democracy promotion, and transnational issues (crime, health, environment, migration, drugs). The three most commonly cited factors [26] responsible for perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are:

• Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities and processes [27]; • Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for “stove-piping,” with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, discouraging domestically oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority, either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and

• Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any, familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and agencies.

More Details about The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform

Some analysts also cite strong disagreements among key players over the general purposes of and means to conduct missions as factors impeding successful performance. Improved institutional arrangements and enhanced leadership may provide the means to reduce such disagreements, or their worst effect, in some, but not all, missions.

The perceived problems surface and have repercussions at all levels: in the field (U.S. embassies or interagency operations on-the-ground), at an intermediate (regional) level, at department headquarters in Washington, DC, and within the Executive Office of the President, that is, the White House. How these problems manifest themselves in interagency missions is briefly outlined in the section immediately below. The next section provides an overview of proposals to address these problems, with extended discussion in the appendices.

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

1. 25 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, Report required by Section 1049, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110-181, Arlington, VA, November 2008. Hereinafter cited as Project on National Security Reform 2008. PNSR found the mob scene phenomenon “especially [prevalent] in our attempts to manage the numerous so-called ‘softpowers’ resident in diverse organizations within the federal government.” p. 517.

   26 The Government Accountability Office provides an overview of the issues in National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-822T, June 9, 2010. This document categorizes the problems somewhat differently than This information. Its categories are: (1) developing and implementing overarching, integrated strategies to achieve national security objectives; (2) creating collaborative organizations that facilitate integrated national security approaches; (3) developing a well-trained workforce; (4) sharing and integrating national security information across agencies; and (5) importance of sustained leadership.

2. 27 Many civilian departments and agencies play a role in the missions and activities covered by This information. More than a dozen civilian executive branch departments and agencies may be involved in stabilization and reconstruction missions and other national security activities abroad. As most would expect, these include the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Others are the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Heath and Human Services, Transportation, and Treasury, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Further Reading

• Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
• Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
• Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
• SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
• Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
• ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
• Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
• Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
• PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
• QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
• CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
• CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
• QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
• RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
• CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Control
  ling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
• DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
• Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
• Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
• SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
• NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

  Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

• PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
• PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
• Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

  U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

• Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
• Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

  Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

• Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
• QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
• QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.