Licence in United States

Licence 

A limited right to travel over or use the property of another. A licence may be the object of a contract or gratuitous. A gratuitous licensee may have difficulty bringing an action in tort against the licensor unless the licensor was grossly negligent in failing to reveal some hidden danger on their property which they reasonably ought to have indicated.

The common law distinguished between invitee, licensee, and trespasser in cases of torts against an owner.
An invitee is one who goes onto another’s premises in response  [*5]  to an express or implied invitation and does so for the mutual benefit of both the owner and himself. A licensee, on the other hand, “is one who enters onto another’s premises with the possessor’s permission, express or implied, solely for his own purposes rather than the possessor’s benefit.” Mazzacco, 303 N.C. at 497, 279 S.E.2d at 586-87. The classic example of a licensee is a social guest. See, e.g., Crane v. Caldwell, 113 N.C. App. 362, 366, 438 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1994). Lastly, a trespasser is one who enters another’s premises without permission or other right.

There is a descending degree of duty owed by a   landowner based upon the plaintiff’s status. Id. at 561, 467 S.E.2d at 63.

The highest degree of care a landowner owes is the duty of reasonable care toward those entrants classified as invitees. See Roumillat, 331 N.C. at 64, 414 S.E.2d at 342. Specifically, a landowner owes an invitee a duty to use ordinary care to keep his property reasonably safe and to warn of hidden perils or unsafe conditions that could be discovered by reasonable inspection and supervision. See Pulley, 326 N.C. at 705, 392 S.E.2d at 383.

A landowner’s duty toward a licensee, on the other hand, is significantly less stringent. The duty of care owed to a licensee by an owner or possessor of land ordinarily is to refrain from doing the licensee willful injury and from wantonly and recklessly exposing him to danger. McCurry v. Wilson, 90 N.C. App. 642, 645, 369 S.E.2d 389, 392. Thus, a licensee enters  another’s premises at his own risk and enjoys the license subject to its concomitant perils.  See Turpin v. Our Lady of Mercy Catholic Church, 20 N.C. App. 580, 583, 202  [*7]  S.E.2d 351, 353 (1974).

Finally, with respect to trespassers, a landowner need only refrain from the willful or wanton  infliction of injury. See Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711 (1967). Willful injury constitutes actual knowledge of the danger combined with a design, purpose, or intent to do wrong and inflict injury. See Howard v. Jackson, 120 N.C. App. 243, 246, 461 S.E.2d 793, 797  (1995). Similarly, a wanton act is performed intentionally with a reckless indifference to the  injuries likely to result. Id.

Those jurisdictions which reject the traditional rule  generally adopt a “reasonably prudent person under the circumstances” test – which would still distinguish between invited and uninvited guests.

The harder case is that of liability for a tenant who is the victim of a burglary. There, landlords have a “common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm,” including a third party’s foreseeable criminal conduct ( Jacqueline S. v

City of New York, 81 NY2d 288, 293-294, rearg denied 82 NY2d 749; see, Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507, 519-520). A tenant may recover damages, however, only on a showing that the landlord’s negligent conduct was a proximate cause of the injury ( Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 509).

Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty, 92 N.Y.2d 544; 706 N.E.2d 1163; 1998 N.Y. LEXIS 4039; 684 N.Y.S.2d 139