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16 responses to “Laches”

1. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   Here is one way in which a statute of limitations and laches may conflict. Laches requires a showing that there has been “unreasonable delay.” Mere delay that is not unreasonable is not enough.

   The problem is if Congress decided that the SOL is a certain time, how can a Court say that less than that is not “reasonable.”

   To some extent courts deal with that by adopting a presumption that there is no laches if the claim is brought within the SOL, and a presumption of laches if the claims were brought outside it. But those are rebuttable presumptions. Problem is why should a court be allowed to second guess Congress’ determiantion of what is reasonable? (Let’s say someone brings a copyright claim within two years when the SOL is three. Why should a court be allowed to determine that such delay was not reasonable, when Congress has in effect says it is?)

   A complicating factor in all this is cases where you have a continuing tort. Someone sells copyright infringements for 10 years. On the SOL side, you are not barred, because the last sale was within the three year SOL, although damages are limited to a three-year lookback. But when it comes to an injunction and laches, courts generally look to the first sale, which would often mean denial of an injunction due to laches, since, in this example, the plaintiff waited 10 years to bring suit.

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2. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   David M. Nieporent

   “Problem is why should a court be allowed to second guess Congress’ determiantion of what is reasonable?”

   Who said Congress said that it was? When Congress passes a SoL, it may be saying that anything outside the SoL is necessarily an unreasonable delay¹ ; that’s not the same as saying that everything within the SoL is necessarily reasonable.

   ¹ But note that this, too, can be overruled by a court, based on the discovery rule, the doctrine of equitable tolling, etc.

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3. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   By passing an SOL, Congress is announcing that as the limit for bringing such claims. SOL’s are supposed to protect defendants from stale claims, and strike a balance between that interest and the plaintiff’s right for relief. Passing an SOL essentially sets a line where Congress’s (or the legistlature’s) judgment is that the balance tips in favor of the defendant. And that alerts the plaintiffs that they have that much time to file suit.

   What is “unreasonable” about bringing a claim within the SOL? (Reasonableness here in terms of balancing the rights of the parties to the suit. Sure, the CEO of the plaintiff might kick the GC in the rear end for sitting on the company’s rights for so long, but that is a different matter.)

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4. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   Cannot a legislature enact a statute of limitations without necessarily abolishing laches? You note that laches contains a ‘reasonableness’ factor while statutes of limitation are usually arbitrary fixed periods during which a claimant must ‘use or lose’ his rights. Absent an explicit statutory abolition of laches, why would it not be possible for the two to co-exist?

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5. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   David E. Frydrychowski

   I thought laches precluded the claim, not the remedy. The petitioner can’t state a claim for something that he has countenanced/condoned. Put it this way. Jimbob sues Evil Inc. for 1m. Jimbob waited 20 years to raise the claim. If laches bars the remedy, not the claim, it would preclude (equitable) disgorgement but not (legal) damages. If it bars the claim, both remedies could be barred. Not my corner of the legal sky, btw. Just curious.

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6. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   David E. Frydrychowski

   My point is that it bars the claim, not the remedy, so we need to consider whether it impacts an otherwise exogenous remedy tied to an affected claim. And if the courts simply mimic the outcomes of the divided bench without considering whether those outcomes are philosophically justified (and not just the consequence of administrative logic), the decision to have only one form of civil action seems inconsequential.

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7. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   Chris Tompkins

   My impression is that a SoL does not displace the doctrine of laches though I can’t say that I’ve ever researched the issue to any extent. If that’s the case, then presumably Congress is aware of that and doesn’t intend to abolish laches just be enacting a SoL. Congress certainly could enact a SoL and also say that laches does not apply to the claim and then there would be no laches argument but absent such a statute, laches would (and IMO, should) still apply.

   Getting more nuanced though, not every SoL is equal. Some SoLs apply a certain amount of time after plaintiff becomes aware of the claim and others bar the claim whether plaintiff is aware of it or not. I’m not sure that laches does (or should) apply the same way as between these two types of SoL.

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8. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   David E. Frydrychowski
   My understanding of this is tenous, but it seems to be like polarized light. Equitable only affects equitable and legal only affects legal. That’s why the article concludes that the equitable defence to the equitable remedy survives displacement by the SOL — it’s just on another wavelength. My suggestion is that the equitable defense apply to any _claim_ that (even partially) sounds in equity. I agree that an equitable remedy is susceptible to an equitable defense, but this defense seems to speak more to the claim than the remedy. And if the claim is barred/offset, all remedies would be barred/offset. Again, I’m an amateur with respect to this stuff.

   UPDATE/ L’ESPIRIT D’ESCALIER/WHAT YOU WILL

   As I think about this, I really think that allowing the equitable defense to cancel the legal claim is the right call. If the plaintiff invokes equity, he or she should be held to equity. This seems justified both under traditional principles of equity (“he who seeks equity must do equity”) and the history of the relationship between equity and law (equity as a forum of ‘close’ personal jurisdiction with the power to individually cancel unjust applications of law). In short, if you invite the bishop (“chancery,” which Blackstone traces to “cancel”) into the room, you have to accept his plenary jurisdiction.

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9. 

   International

   December 20, 2017

   Equity arises from the common law and as such is judge made law. This to say that equity by definition arises from the judicial branches independent authority. Unlike Sam Bray I do not believe that Congress can ever abrogate equity because to do so would abrogate the judicial branch’s independence.

   The answer, to my mind, lies in comity. If Congress has legislated on the issue then the courts defer to that SOL unless it would result in a manifest injustice under equity.

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10. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    I think its pretty clear that Congress could abolish equity in its entirety if it wanted (at least as a separation of powers issue, maybe there could be a due process issue) . Equity follows the law and congress makes the law. Changing equity is changing the substantive law that courts apply which seems clearly a legislative power. Not seeing any separation of powers issue with legislatures replacing laches with SOLs. Legislature abrogate judicial made rules all the time and the typical understanding is that the statue wins in the event of a conflict.

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11. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    Among other things, doesn’t this argument imply that the Anti-Injunction Act, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, et al., are all unconstitutional because they limit the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions? That seems like a novel argument.

    An example would be that tolling SOLs for delayed discovery is an equitable doctrine , but nobody questions the ability of congress to pass statutes of repose where there is no equitable tolling,

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12. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    In a moment of serendipity, I just came across a recent decision of the Supreme Court of NM that essentially takes my position.

    “in no event should that prior opinion be read as somehow vesting our courts with the equitable power to ignore the clear mandate of our Rules of Professional Conduct. ” (p,12). By which I take the operative word to be “clear”. This is a little bit different than my manifest injustice standard but as the discussion in that NM case makes clear courts *do* maintain equitable powers only they do not triumph a “clear” statement by the legislature. In this regard the court has held to a somewhat looser standard than Sam Bay on that point.

    Anyway, to answer your specific question “you think that common law principles are Constuintionalied?” Nope, never said any such thing. If you fail at reading comprehension, not my issue.

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13. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    David M. Nieporent

    This decision not only doesn’t “essentially take your position,” but (if you had interpreted it correctly, which you hadn’t) would refute your position. Your position was that the legislature can’t displace the court’s equitable remedies because that would violate the separation of powers because they arise from common law. I think that’s completely wrong; there’s no constitutional right to the common law; legislatures can displace the common law at will.
    This decision is actually irrelevant to that, because the Rules of Professional Conduct are not legislative in the first place; they’re judicial. But this decision says that the Rules do supersede the equitable powers of courts, so if the Rules were legislative, this decision would refute your position.

    And, yes, you did say that they were constitutionalized: “I do not believe that Congress can ever abrogate equity because to do so would abrogate the judicial branch’s independence.” That’s a constitutional argument.

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14. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    “The petitioner, who lost below because the lower courts invoked laches,
    has argued that laches is entirely precluded because Congress enacted a
    statute of limitations.”

    I don’t see how that can be right. The Supreme Court held in eBay v. Mercexchange that an injunction is never automatic and is always subject to the equitable discretion governed by the four factors mentioned there. One of which is balance of the harms. (I know that is not exactly the same thing as laches, but it is related). So if the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit has caused prejudice to the defendant, I don’t see how the court can just ignore that when deciding whether to issue an injunction.

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15. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    David M. Nieporent

    In deciding whether to issue the injunction, the hardships to balance are the hardships caused by the granting vel non of the injunction, taking into account the situation at the time a party moves for an injunction. Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiff’s delay is an entirely separate question.

    That having been said, of course a plaintiff’s delay can be relevant to the granting of an injunction. I had an employment case where a fired employee waited a year and a half and then asked the court to issue an injunction ordering the employer to rehire him. Hard to square the 18-month delay with the claim that there would be irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.

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16. 

    International

    December 20, 2017

    I have long been of the belief that we ought to do away with laches when there is a statute of limitiations governing the cause of action. I think litigants should be able to rely on a known strict deadline and not have to worry about getting blindsided by the unpredictable application of a mushy equitable doctrine barring their case.

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