Interagency Cooperation

Interagency Cooperation in United States

Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation in the above context, reporting on the key problems and reform proposals, offering the essential facts of the topic.Problems with strategic planning and leadership are most often attributed to deficiencies at the White House, particularly the National Security Council (NSC) [28]. The National Security Council, consisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and others, is the ultimate locus for integrating foreign policy and national security strategy and policy making. Through its directorates and staff, it at times has been responsible for coordinating or even directing policy implementation. The term “National Security Council” is sometimes used to encompass the council itself, as well as National Security Council directorates and staff. Despite its central role, many analysts consider National Security Council staff (currently numbering some 300, including detailees) and procedures inadequate to effectively oversee steady state interagency missions and, almost invariably, prone to be overwhelmed by crises.

Crises reveal the full range of perceived problems in interagency missions. Strategic planning can break down. The usual practice calls for the relevant State Department regional bureau to direct civilian crisis planning and implementation in conjunction with the National Security Council, which meshes it with Department of Defense planning if necessary. In the case of disagreements, the National Security Council may not always be able to play a mediating function. Usually, ad hoc staff-level interagency task forces are formed to coordinate the activities of civilian agencies and Department of Defense. Task forces can form at the department level and the field level. Operations can be complicated by their members’ lack of interagency experience and knowledge of other agencies’ contributions and different cultures. In the field, task forces can be creative, devising solutions to problems. But task force members can end up at odds when they refer problems the task force cannot resolve up their individual chains of command.

More Details about Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation

Structural weaknesses manifest themselves at the department level, where steady state policies, plans, and programs are developed, and at the field level, where programs are implemented. Both planning and implementation are theoretically conducted in accordance with the President’s broad policy guidance as developed through National Security Council (NSC) processes and meetings of the President’s Cabinet, but agency interests, personalities, the availability of resources, and other factors affect outcomes.

The panoply of players, each with their own priorities and perspectives, illustrates the difficulties of developing plans for civilian foreign affairs activities and efforts. This function is usually led by the State Department and shared (not necessarily equally) by State Department regional and functional bureaus, by United States Agency for International Development and other agencies where appropriate, and by the Ambassadors at U.S. embassies. The implementation of field-level efforts and activities is reviewed, approved or disapproved, and overseen by the State Department regional and functional bureaus, which also secure funding for them. In other civilian agencies (i.e., the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture, among others), headquarters units involved in foreign affairs play a large role in planning and implementing their activities as their presence abroad is often very limited. At the headquarters level, collaboration and coordination among civilian agencies varies, but often may be minimal.

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

  1. 28 For more information on the National Security Council (NSC), see Appendix A and CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, by Richard A. Best Jr.

Further Reading

  • Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
  • Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
  • Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
  • SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
  • Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
  • ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
  • Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
  • Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
  • PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
  • QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
  • CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
  • CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
  • QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
  • RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
  • CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
  • DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
  • Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
  • Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
  • SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
  • NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

    Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

  • PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
  • PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
  • Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

    U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

  • Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
  • Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

    Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

  • Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
  • QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
  • QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
  • RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
  • RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.

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