Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad in United States

Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Introduction in relation to Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad

This section discusses generally the subject of Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Introduction in the above context, offering the key elements of the topic.Some U.S. policymakers share widespread concern that the United States cannot conduct “whole of government” missions and activities abroad efficiently and effectively. For the 112th Congress, various proposals to reform interagency authorities, organizations, processes, and personnel dedicated to foreign missions may be of interest, especially as it considers ways to maintain U.S. power and influence as it reduces expenditures. Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S. government personnel in national security agencies [1], and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011 [2], as well as the recently approved Global Security Contingency Fund, providing an integrated State Department-Department of Defense budget for certain types of security assistance [3]. The FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) requires the President to submit to specified congressional committees within 270 days of enactment “an implementation plan for achieving the ‘whole-of-government’ integration vision prescribed in the President’s National Security Strategy of May 2010.” (See the section on “The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform,” below).

For nearly two decades, policymakers have pondered many questions regarding “interagency” missions and activities abroad—including stabilization and reconstruction, security assistance, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency—in a search to improve them. A primary question is the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, in conducting these missions and activities. Other questions concern the recommended changes in authorities, processes, organization, structures, and personnel resources to optimize their use. As policymakers and analysts contemplate the range of probable near- and medium-term future threats—particularly the potential spillover effects of state instability and intrastate conflict, and the growth of terrorist and organized criminal activity—a consensus has grown that major challenges to U.S. national security over the next decades will require interagency responses [4]. Nonetheless, despite a growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is little agreement on the solutions.

More Details about Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Introduction

Congress has played a leading role in some aspects of interagency reform. For instance, the George W. Bush Administration’s creation in 2004 of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was promoted by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator (now Vice President) Joe Biden [5]. Some Members call for additional congressional initiatives.

To provide context for the 112th Congress’s continuing consideration of interagency reform, This information provides perspectives on the questions and issues raised by a broad range of reform proposals offered by research organizations and selected experts. The focus is on proposals for civilian institutions and personnel. Although Department of Defense is a key player in the missions and activities that are the object of proposed reform, its very dominance in many areas underlies calls for reform to build civilian capacity [6]. Thus, This information discusses Department of Defense reforms only to the extent that they would foster improved interaction with civilians.

Some Aspects

This information starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and 2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives, followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure. (Appendix A provides a fuller discussion of interagency authorities and structures.) The report then provides a short synopsis of the content of reform proposals recommended or published by some three dozen foreign policy and defense organizations and experts. (Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, and Appendix E provide a broader discussion of proposed reforms, with tables of the proposals.) The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1) is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must congressional reform accompany other national security measures?

Note: Based on the Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress Report.

Resources

Notes and References

1. 1 Identical bills for The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 were introduced in 2011: S. 1268, introduced by Senator Lieberman and H.R. 2314, introduced by Representatives Davis and Tierney. S. 1268 was passed by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on October 20, 2011. For details on these bills, see CRS Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale.

   2 The Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 3660, introduced December 14, 2011, would transfer specified stabilization and reconstruction functions, personnel, and assets of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies to a new, independent entity, the United States Office for Contingency Operations, which would report to the State Department and Department of Defense.

   3 Identical versions of legislation to create a Global Security Contingency Fund were contained in Section 1204, H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as passed by the House on May 26, 2011, and Section 924, H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2012, as passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 21, 2011. A different version was reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 22, 2011, as Section 1207, S. 1253, FY2012 NDAA. Congress passed a third version as Section 1207 of H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA, which was signed into law on December 31, 2011 (P.L. 112-81).

2. 4 For instance, the September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), issued just two weeks after the terrorist attacks on the United States known as 9/11, featured two emergent elements in the U.S. security environment. These were: (1) increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, and (2) the diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. In the September 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush Administration emphasized the need to “transform America’s national security institution,” stating that the “major institutions of American security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.” By the time the Bush Administration issued its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review , the need for interagency reform had become a central ten
   ant of U.S. thinking about national security. “The Department of Defense cannot meet today’s complex challenges alone,” that Quadrennial Defense Review stated. “Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.” (Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 5; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 29, and Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 83.) For a summary of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review’s depiction of future challenges, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by Stephen Daggett.

   5 For more on State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the development of civilian stabilization capabilities, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.

   6 This concern is voiced by policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum and by military and Department of Defense leaders as well. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen (now retired) reportedly stated in March 2010: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough [to invest in civilian departments]….U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our overseas commands and not enough on the State Department.” This quote is taken from news reports about his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at the University of Kansas; it does not appear in the prepared text and remarks published on the CJCS website.

Further Reading

• Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
• Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.
• Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.
• SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
• Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
• ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
• Brookings/Center for Strategic and International Studies 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
• Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009).
• PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
• QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.
• CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
• CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.
• QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The Quadrennial Defense Review in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
• RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.
• CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
• DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.
• Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
• Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
• SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.
• NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

  Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

• PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
• PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
• Stimson/American Academy of Diplomacy 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

  U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

• Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.
• Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

  Council on Foreign Relations 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

• Council on Foreign Relations 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.
• QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.
• QDDR 2010—U.S. State Depa
  rtment and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.
• RAND/American Academy of Diplomacy 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.