Exclusionary Rule in the United States
- 1 Exclusionary Rule in the United States
- 2 Exclusionary Rule in the United States
- 2.1 Exclusionary Rule Defined. Introduction
- 2.2 History of the Exclusionary Rule
- 2.3 The Exclusionary Rule Explained
- 2.4 Primary Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule
- 2.5 Rule of Exclusion
- 2.6 Illegal Detention
- 2.7 Exceptions
- 2.8 Expectation of Privacy
- 2.9 Juvenile Cases
- 2.10 On Appeal
- 2.11 Efects
- 2.12 The Exclusionary Rule: Main Elements
- 2.13 References
- 2.14 Exclusionary Rule Background
- 2.15 Resources
A court-fashioned rule of evidence that in criminal trial prohibits the use of items gained from an unconstitutional search or seizure. The Exclusionary Rule was designed to give effect to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The rule is highly controversial and is not explicitly required by the Fourth Amendment. Until 1914, common law provided that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment could still be used in a criminal trial. Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383: 1914) broke from the tradition and established the Exclusionary Rule in federal cases. The Supreme Court said that without the rule, the Fourth Amendment is of no value and “might as well be stricken from the Constitution.” The Court refrained, however, from taking a parallel step for state criminal trials. In Wolf v. Colorado (338 U.S. 25: 1949), the Court chose to leave the states free to choose whether the rule would operate in their courts. In 1949 the Court did not see the rule as essential enough that it must be extended to the states. Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643: 1961) overruled Wolf and established the rule for state trials. Since Mapp, the Court has had occasion to consider the Exclusionary Rule (Criminal Process) quite often. While the Court has chosen to retain the rule, dissatisfaction with it is apparent. Two patterns are revealed in the Court’s … handling of the rule. First, the rule will not be extended beyond the trial setting. The Burger Court rejected extension of it to grand jury proceedings in United States v. Calandra (414 U.S. 338: 1974). The Court then allowed illegally obtained evidence to be used in a civil tax proceeding in United States v. Janis (429 U.S. 874: 1976). Second, the Court is willing to limit the coverage of the rule. It allowed otherwise inadmissible evidence to be used in impeaching a defendant’s trial testimony in Oregon v. Hass (420 U.S. 714: 1975), and it limited habeas corpus access to the federal courts in state search cases in Stone v. Powell (428 U.S. 465: 1976).
Analysis and Relevance
The Exclusionary Rule is justified in many ways. It is seen by many as an indispensable doctrine for making operational the personal protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The rule creates disincentives for police misconduct in the search context by making the products of such searches inadmissible. Others argue that the Exclusionary Rule (U.S.) protects the integrity of the courts by keeping the judicial process free of illegally seized evidence. Criticisms of the rule are numerous and substantial, however. Many regard it as excessive because it goes beyond Fourth Amendment provisions. The costs of the rule are seen as too high because it often results in criminal conduct going unpunished. Further, it tends to defeat the best test of evidence, which is its reliability. The rule frequently allows suppression of reliable evidence because the means of obtaining it were flawed. In sum, critics of the Exclusionary Rule (U.S.) argue that instead of sanctioning police officers, the rule rewards criminal defendants. The rule is clearly threatened as political pressures mount to modify it. The Exclusionary Rule (U.S.) survives because its detractors have not been able to find an adequate alternative. However, in the British legal system, for example, illegally obtained evidence can be introduced in a case with police miconduct subject to administrative discipline.
Notes and References
- Definition of Exclusionary Rule from the American Law Dictionary, 1991, California
Exclusionary Rule in the United States
Exclusionary Rule Defined. Introduction
In the United States, the exclusionary rule allows a criminal defendant to prevent illegal searches or prosecutions that violate the rights set forth in the U.S. Fourth Amendment by introducing at trial evidence against the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
There are several exclusionary rules. The rule against hearsay, exclude evidence because it is not very reliable. The rule prohibiting a witness from testifying if the calling party did not disclose the witness before trial, are sanctions for the failure to comply with a nonconstitutional rule. In the last years, this remedy has been significantly limited by the Herring case.
History of the Exclusionary Rule
“The exclusionary rule was originally adopted in Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, which barred evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the rule was not constitutionally imposed upon the states. (Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25; see Breithaupt v. Abram (1957) 352 U.S. 432, 434. It was not until 1961, when Wolf was overruled, that the exclusionary rule was made mandatory in state prosecutions. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643; see Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 766.)” (People v. Bracamonte, supra, at p. 400, fn. 2.)
“The history of the rule reflects this ambivalence. The common law did not allow the exclusion of evidence on account of irregularities in the way in which a party acquired it. Instead, a citizen wronged by an illegal search could sue the wrongdoers for the tort of trespass. Anyone who invaded another”s property was guilty of trespass and had to pay damages, unless the intruder had some positive legal authority such as a valid warrant. The framers of the Fourth Amendment included the warrant clause to prevent the new government from cutting off the trespass remedy by issuing general warrants—one of the abuses that had incited the revolution.
A decline in the efficacy of the tort remedy coincided with the development of modern police forces in the mid–nineteenth century. Typically the police did not (and do not) target the rich and powerful for intrusive investigations. The generally poor, generally uneducated, and often minority-race victims of illegal searches were in a poor position to recruit lawyers to bring suits; they certainly could not count on generous jury verdicts against the police.
The Supreme Court recognized the exclusionary rule early in the twentieth century. Although the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule may have arisen from the then-prevailing view that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination shielded individuals from having their own property used against them as evidence, the early cases soon recognized a Fourth Amendment right to suppress illegally seized evidence even when the party invoking the rule had no Fifth Amendment rights (i.e., a corporation) and even when the evidence to be suppressed was illegal to possess at all.
The early cases, however, were limited to federal prosecutions. Criminal law enforcement in the United States is primarily the responsibility of state, rather than federal, officers. Some state courts followed the Supreme Court”s lead and adopted the exclusionary rule; others adhered to the common law rule admitting evidence without regard to how it was obtained. Two of the past century”s most celebrated American jurists wrote opposing opinions on the issue during this period. A good way to begin thinking about the exclusionary rule is to compare Judge Benjamin Cardozo”s opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926), refusing to adopt the exclusionary rule, with Justice Roger Traynor”s opinion for the Supreme Court of California in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955), adopting the exclusionary rule.
Not until 1961, in the watershed case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), did the Supreme Court hold that the exclusionary rule applies to the states as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process. In states that had not followed the exclusionary rule on their own prior to Mapp, the Mapp decision had a dramatic impact. Warrant use in major cities went from a handful to hundreds per year; search-and-seizure law became the subject of police training programs. These developments would not have occurred if the tort remedy had been an effective deterrent. Had the tort remedy been effective, the police in states without the exclusionary rule would have been using warrants and training their officers in constitutional law all along.
Even the liberal Warren Court, however, was reluctant to free the guilty. As soon as the rule applied to the states, where crimes of violence are typically prosecuted and where the great majority of prosecutions for all types of offenses are brought, the Court began to adopt narrower interpretations of substantive Fourth Amendment rights, and to recognize exceptions to the exclusionary remedy. For example, shortly after Mapp the Court excluded undercover operations from any scrutiny whatsoever under the Fourth Amendment; refused to apply Mapp to free prisoners previously convicted by illegally obtained evidence; and reaffirmed the rule that only the search victim can invoke the rule, even when the evidence incriminates others.
As the Court grew more conservative during the 1970s (as it has remained ever since), the exceptions to the exclusionary rule have threatened to swallow the rule.”(1)
The Exclusionary Rule Explained
The Fourth Amendment serves as the primary basis for the “Exclusionary Rule;” excluding evidence from the courtroom which would be otherwise admissible, when seized by law enforcement in violation of its terms. (Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652].)
Primary Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule
The primary purpose of the Exclusionary Rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338; Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 799.)
“‘[T]he “prime purpose” of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, “is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 324.)
It is also the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.” (Camera v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528.)
An otherwise lawful seizure can violate the Fourth Amendment if it is executed in an unreasonable manner. (United States v. Alverez-Tejeda (9th Cir. 2007, citing United States v. Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 124)
Evidence illegally obtained by private persons, acting in a private capacity, is not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (See Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 418, 421; People v. North (1981) 29 Cal.3rd 509, 514; Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.App.4th 329, 332.)
Even a peace officer, when off-duty and acting in a private capacity, may be found to have acted as a private citizen. (See People v. Wachter (1976) 58 Cal.App.3rd 911, 920, 922.)
However, the Exclusionary Rule is not intended to prevent all police misconduct or as a remedy for all police errors. “The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.” (United States v. Smith (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3rd 1034, 1040.)
Not all courts are in agreement that such a remedy is reserved exclusively for constitutional violations. (See discussion in United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 882, 886-887, and in the dissenting opinion, p. 893.)
A civil rights “action under (42 U.S.C.) section 1983 “encompasses violations of federal statutory law as well as constitutional law.” (Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) 448 U.S.) Thus, section 1983 may be used to enforce rights created by both the United States Constitution and federal statutes. (Gonzaga University v. Doe (2002) 536 U.S.). But conduct by an official that violates only state law will not support a claim under section 1983. (Malek v. Haun (10th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3rd 1013, 1016;)” (Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.)
See “Remedy for Violations; The “‘Exclusionary Rule,” below.
Rule of Exclusion
In relation to the Rule of Exclusion, “Evidence which is obtained as a direct result of an illegal search and seizure may not be used to establish probable cause for a subsequent search.” (United States v. Wanless (9th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2nd 1459, 1465; see “Searches and Seizures,” “Remedies for Violations,” below.)
This includes “verbal evidence,” (i.e., a suspect”s admissions or confession), when obtained as a direct product of an illegal detention, arrest or search. (See United States v. Crews (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1135.)
But see People v. Madrid (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896: Evidence obtained in violation of someone else”s (i.e., someone other than the present defendant”s) Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) rights may be used as part of the probable cause in a search warrant affidavit, unless the defendant can show that he has “standing” (i.e., it was his reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated) to challenge the use of the evidence.
In relation with Illegal Detention, as a “seizure” of one”s person, the products of an illegal detention are also subject to being suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule. (See People v. Krohn (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294; detaining defendant for drinking in public, when he was not in a public place, is an illegal detention and requires the suppression of the controlled substances found on his person in a subsequent consensual search.)
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: In determining where the line is between the direct products of an illegal search (which will be suppressed) and that which is not the “fruit of the poisonous tree” (which will not be suppressed), the Court ruled that the following factors are relevant: (1) The temporal proximity of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure violation to the ultimate procurement of the challenged evidence; (2) The presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy of the official misconduct. (People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137.)
There are exceptions. Hence, it is a rule of law that neither a person”s body nor his or her identity is subject to suppression, “even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” (Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 [82 L.Ed.2nd 778].)
For purposes of this rule, it makes no difference that the illegal arrest, search or interrogation was “egregious” in nature. (E.g., the result of “racial profiling.” (United States v. Gudino (9th Cir. 2004) 376 F.3rd 997.)
Also, evidence illegally seized may be introduced for the purpose of impeaching the defendant”s testimony given in both direct examination (Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U.S 62 [98 L.Ed. 503].) and cross-examination, so long as the cross-examination questions are otherwise proper. (United States v. Havens (1980) 446 U.S. 620 [64 L.Ed.2nd 559].)
California authority prior to passage of Proposition 8 (The “Truth in Evidence Initiative”), to the effect that evidence suppressed pursuant to a motion brought under authority of P.C. § 1538.5 is suppressed for all purposes (i.e., People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 879, 887-888.), was abrogated by Proposition 8. Now, it is clear that suppressed evidence may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant testify and lie. (People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal.App.3rd 877, 883-886.)
Expectation of Privacy
In relation with Expectation of Privacy, whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore requires the exclusion of evidence obtained thereby, turns on “whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, whether he or she has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search (or seizure) that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” (Emphasis added; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794.)
The United States Supreme Court has held: “Our Fourth Amendment analysis embraces two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that ‘he [sought] to preserve [something] as private.” [Citation.] . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual”s expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” [Citation, fn. omitted.]” (Bond v. United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338 [120 S. Ct. 1462, 1465, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365, 370]; see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.)
Example: A hotline for citizens to call in tips on criminal activity, advertised as guaranteeing the caller”s anonymity, does not create a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in either the caller”s identity or the information provided. It was expected that the information would be passed onto law enforcement. The caller in this case became the suspect in the alleged crimes, thus negating any reasonable expectation to believe that the police would not determine and use his identity in the investigation. (People v. Maury, supra, at pp. 381-403.)
Juvenile Cases: This same exclusionary rule applies to juvenile proceedings that are filed pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code. (In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3rd 550, 567, fn. 17; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 75-76.)
On Appeal: Denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed by an appellate court “de novo.” (United States v. Bautista (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584, 588-589.)
“The rule does not automatically result in acquittal” nor “require returning contraband to the defendant” .(2)
“Why does the law permit the guilty to escape justice because the police violated the Constitution? Would it not make more sense to admit the evidence and punish the police by demotion or suspension, or through civil lawsuits? The standard explanation is that these alternative remedies for constitutional violations have been found, in practice, to be ineffectual. Law enforcement agencies have not shown the willingness to discipline officers whose excesses lead to successful prosecutions. In civil suits against the police, the damages juries might return for illegal searches, together with the good-faith immunity defense available to the police, have blunted the deterrent force of the tort remedy. Freeing the guilty is not very appealing, but doing nothing about violations of the Constitution has seemed even worse.”(3)
“Why does the law permit the guilty to escape justice because the police violated the Constitution? Would it not make more sense to admit the evidence and punish the police by demotion or suspension, or through civil lawsuits? The standard explanation is that these alternative remedies for constitutional violations have been found, in practice, to be ineffectual. Law enforcement agencies have not shown the willingness to discipline officers whose excesses lead to successful prosecutions. In civil suits against the police, the damages juries might return for illegal searches, together with the good-faith immunity defense available to the police, have blunted the deterrent force of the tort remedy. Freeing the guilty is not very appealing, but doing nothing about violations of the Constitution has seemed even worse.”(4)
“The exclusionary rule is still regularly invoked by criminal defendants, but its golden age may have passed. Since the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court has severely limited its application. According to the Court, this rule was not devised to cure all Fourth Amendment violations. Rather, it was designed primarily to deter police misconduct. This construction led to the good faith exception to Fourth Amendment violations established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).” (5)
The Exclusionary Rule: Main Elements
The coverage of The Exclusionary Rule includes the following element(s):
Search and Seizure
Find out an overview of this topic, in relation to The Exclusionary Rule, in the legal Ecyclopedia.
- Criminal Law
- Criminal Procedure
Exclusionary Rule Background
- Dripps, Donald. “Exclusionary Rule.” Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. 2002.
- “Exclusionary Rule.” West”s Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Incorporation Doctrine.
References and Further Reading
- Davies, Thomas Y. “A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests.” American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1983): 611.
- Dripps, Donald A. “Living With Leon.” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 906.
- Foote, Caleb. “Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights.” Minnesota Law Review 39 (1955): 493.
- Hall, Connor. “Letters of Interest to the Profession, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment.” American Bar Association Journal 8 (1922): 646.
- Kamisar, Yale. “Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather Than on an “Empirical Proposition”?” Creighton Law Review 16 (1983): 565.
- La Fave, Wayne R. Search and Seizure, 3rd edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1996.
- Orfield, Myron W., Jr. “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts.” University of Colorado Law Review 63 (1992): 75.
- Schlesinger, Stephen R. Exclusionary Injustice. New York: M. Dekker, 1977.
- Slobogin, Christopher. “Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule.” University of Illinois Law Review (1999): 363.
- Stewart, Potter. “The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases.” Columbia Law Review 83 (1983): 1365.
- Stuntz, William J. “The Virtue and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 20 (1997): 443.
- Thomas, George C., and Pollack, Barry S. “Balancing the Fourth Amendment Scales: The Bad-Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule Limitations.” Hastings Law Journal 45 (1993): 21.
- Wigmore, John Henry. “Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure.” American Bar Association Journal 8 (1922): 479.
- Calabresi, Guido. 2003. “The Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 26.
- “Criminal Procedure.” 1993. The Conviser Mini Review. Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications.
- Eiben, Valerie L. 1987. “The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: The New Federalism and a Texas Proposal.” St. Mary”s Law Journal 18.
- Glasser, Larry. 2003. “The American Exclusionary Rule Debate.” George Washington International Law Review 35.
- Israel, Jerold H., Yale Kamisar, and Wayne R. LaFave. 1993. Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. St. Paul, Minn.: West.
- Kamisar, Yale. 2003. “In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 26.
- Rules of Procedure
- Rule According to Law
- Letter Ruling
- Exclusionary Rule
- Legal Rule
- Rules Against Perpetuities
- Interpretative Rules
- Local Rules
- Rule of Convenience
- Rule of Lenity
- Rule of Reason in Interpretation
- Rule in Shelley’s Case
Related Case Law
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Further Reading (Books)
Davies, Thomas Y. “A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of ‘Lost’ Arrests.” American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1983): 611.
Dripps, Donald A. “Living With Leon.” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 906.
Foote, Caleb. “Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights.” Minnesota Law Review 39 (1955): 493.
Hall, Connor. “Letters of Interest to the Profession, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment.” American Bar Association Journal 8 (1922): 646.
Kamisar, Yale. “Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a ‘Principled Basis’ Rather Than on an ‘Empirical Proposition’?” Creighton Law Review 16 (1983): 565.
LaFave, Wayne R. Search and Seizure, 3rd edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1996.
Orfield, Myron W., Jr. “Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts.” University of Colorado Law Review 63 (1992): 75.
Schlesinger, Stephen R. Exclusionary Injustice. New York: M. Dekker, 1977.
Slobogin, Christopher. “Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule.” University of Illinois Law Review (1999): 363.
Stewart, Potter. “The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases.” Columbia Law Review 83 (1983): 1365.
Stuntz, William J. “The Virtue and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 20 (1997): 443.
Thomas, George C., and Pollack, Barry S. “Balancing the Fourth Amendment Scales: The Bad-Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule Limitations.” Hastings Law Journal 45 (1993): 21.
Wigmore, John Henry. “Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure.” American Bar Association Journal 8 (1922): 479.
Further Reading (Articles)
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the Rationale of Hudson V. Michigan to Evidence Seized during Unauthorized Nighttime Searches, Brigham Young University Law Review; January 1, 2007; Gittins, Jeffry R.
Exclusion of the Exclusionary Rule: Hudson V. Michigan, Jones Law Review; March 22, 2007; Brown, Eric
The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, Harvard Law Review; May 1, 2014; Re, Richard M.
Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; June 22, 1996; Jackson, Heather A.
Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument against the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Fordham Urban Law Journal; May 1, 2010; Pettys, Todd E.
Arizona v. Evans: Expanding exclusionary rule exceptions and contracting Fourth Amendment protection, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; July 1, 1996; Jackson, Heather A
A Plymouth, a Parolee, and the Police: The Case for the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Forfeiture after Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole V. Scott, Albany Law Review; September 22, 2001; Crandley, Mark J.
HIGH COURT DECISION DUMPING EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDERMINES ESTABLISHED BALANCE, US Fed News Service, Including US State News; July 18, 2006
The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin; September 1, 1997; Hendrie, Edward M.
Exclusionary Rule, Encyclopedia of the American Constitution; January 1, 2000
The interaction of the standing and inevitable discovery doctrines of the exclusionary rule: use of evidence illegally obtained from the defendant and a third party., Iowa Law Review; March 1, 2006; Giddings, Julie M.
riminal Procedure – Good-Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule Extends to Illegal Searches Based on Police Recordkeeping Errors – Herring V. United States, Suffolk University Law Review; January 1, 2010; Codagnone, Amy L.
An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, Missouri Law Review; March 22, 2010; Cicchini, Michael D.
CAP ONE’S U.K. CARD HURT DEFENSE OF EXCLUSIONARY RULES.(Brief Article), Cardline; October 12, 2001
Q: Does ‘Reform’ of the Exclusionary Rule Threaten Our Liberties?, Insight on the News; December 11, 1995; Glasser, Ira McCollum, Bill
Six observations on the exclusionary rule, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy; January 1, 1997; Stephen J Markman
Exclusionary rule in peril? U.S. Supreme Court ruling sparks concern, Lawyers USA; February 24, 2009; Kimberly Atkins
Exclusionary Rule’s Crucial Role, The Washington Times (Washington, DC); October 5, 2008
Justices uphold improper search case Exclusionary rule said to be flexible, International Herald Tribune; January 15, 2009; David Stout The New York Times Media Group
The virtues and vices of the exclusionary rule, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy; January 1, 1997; William J Stuntz